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Abstract
This paper sets out a recent transition in our thinking in relation to psychopathology associated with personality
disorder, in an approach that integrates our thinking about attachment, mentalizing (understanding ourselves
and others in terms of intentional mental states) and epistemic trust (openness to the reception of social
communication that is personally relevant and of generalizable significance) with recent findings on the structure
of both adult and child psychopathology and resilience. In this paper – the first of two parts – we review evidence
suggesting that a general psychopathology or p factor underlies vulnerability for psychopathology. We link this
p factor to a lack of resilience using Kalisch and colleagues’ positive appraisal style theory of resilience (PASTOR).
We argue that vulnerability for (severe) psychopathology results from impairments in three central mechanisms
underlying resilience – positive situation classification, retrospective reappraisal of threat, and inhibition of
retraumatizing triggers – which in turn result from a lack of flexibility in terms of social communicative processes.
We suggest that, from this perspective, personality disorders, and borderline personality disorder (BPD) in particular,
can be considered to be the prototype of disorders characterized by a lack of resilience. Part 2 proposes an
evolutionary developmental psychopathology account linking this inflexibility in social communication to problems
with the development of epistemic trust – that is, an evolutionary pre-wired social communication system that
normally facilitates resilience through salutogenesis, that is, the capacity to learn and derive benefit from the (social)
environment.
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Background
A challenge for contemporary thinking about psychopath-
ology arises from a general neglect by adult psychopatholo-
gists of the developmental psychopathology tradition
established by Sroufe and Rutter [1] over 30 years ago. Spe-
cifically, the fact that when we consider an individual’s psy-
chiatric history over their life course, it rarely follows the
discrete, symptom-led and time-limited categories that
traditional models have used in conceptualizing mental dis-
order. This has increasingly come to be regarded as consti-
tuting a slow-burning crisis in the way we understand, and
by extension treat, mental disorders. There is a heightened
recognition of the salience of transdiagnostic features in
clinical presentations as well as across treatment protocols
[2, 3]. Particularly in cases of more severe and persistent
mental health difficulties, an individual’s clinical presenta-
tion changes over time, one typical example being progres-
sion from conduct disorder to depression [4], or the
extensive comorbidity between traditional ‘symptom’ disor-
ders and personality disorders (PDs) (e.g. [5]).
Here we posit a reconceptualization of psychopath-
ology associated with PD that speaks to these conceptual
and diagnostic enigmas, in an approach that integrates
our thinking about mentalizing (i.e. understanding our-
selves and others in terms of intentional mental states)
and epistemic trust (i.e. openness to the reception of so-
cial communication that is personally relevant and of
generalizable significance) with recent findings on the
structure of both adult and child psychopathology [3]
and resilience [6].
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At the core of the thinking set out here is an
emphasis on the relationship between the social envir-
onment as a system on the one hand, and individual
differences in the capacity for social cognition (as de-
fined below) on the other. We argue that the pres-
ence or absence of resilience is the outcome of the
dynamics of this relationship. Understanding the
nature of resilience, we suggest, requires engagement
at the level of the mechanism that channels the rela-
tionship between the social layer of communication
and the individual’s capacity for reorganizing mental
processes. Attempts to intervene at the level of non-
resilient responses, we suggest, can be of only limited
effectiveness. This, we argue, explains the lack of clin-
ical response of patients with BPD features to many
traditional psychotherapeutic interventions.
A further informing principle is that the type of func-
tioning associated with many forms of psychopathology
might best be understood as an evolutionarily driven
form of entrenched adaptation to stimuli from the social
environment – often in interaction with genetic propen-
sity [7] – rather than as a mere deficit. It is this adaptive
imperative that underpins the enduring quality that is
central to definitions of PD. The ‘borderline mind’, and
related severe problems with social communication typ-
ically observed in what we commonly refer to as ‘per-
sonality pathology’, may therefore best be understood as
a socially triggered outcome, a learned expectation about
cultural context. Hence, while the processes we describe
in this paper may be implicated in most, if not all, types
of psychopathology, we consider severe PD, and BPD in
particular, to be prototypical of the type of social com-
munication problems that we now see as lying at the
root of vulnerability for severe psychopathology.
Finally, in terms of clinical implications, we will indi-
cate how this change in perspective drives a shift in clin-
ical focus beyond the consulting room to the wider
social systems that can promote resilience.
In the first part of this paper we review emerging evi-
dence that a general psychopathology (or ‘p’) factor
underlying psychopathology provides a comprehensive
explanation for the extensive comorbidity among disor-
ders, as well as many of the other features of individuals
who we traditionally consider to be ‘hard to reach’. We
then argue that this p factor should not be primarily
seen in terms of the presence of specific vulnerability
factors (although these may well play an important role,
and may be primarily responsible for the phenomeno-
logical heterogeneity observed among and within disor-
ders), but in terms of the absence of resilience. We
outline the recently formulated comprehensive positive
appraisal style theory of resilience (PASTOR), and apply
it to BPD as the prototype of disorders characterized by
the absence of resilience. We argue that the absence of
resilience in BPD results from an inflexibility in the hu-
man capacity for social communication, and in problems
with recalibrating the mind in the face of adverse experi-
ences in interaction with others in particular.
In the second part of this paper, we will relate this lack
of social communicative flexibility to impairments in
epistemic trust from an evolutionary and developmental
psychopathology perspective, and discuss the clinical im-
plications of this shift in our views.
A general factor in psychopathology
Our starting point is the challenge presented to the trad-
itional taxonomic structure of psychopathology by co-
morbidity (concurrent and sequential over time),
recurrence and the unwieldy proliferation of diagnostic
disorders. In our opinion, this challenge has been com-
pellingly met by the suggestion that there is a general
factor of psychopathology – in the words of Caspi and
colleagues, ‘one underlying dimension that summarized
individuals’ propensity to develop any and all forms of
common psychopathologies’ ([3], p. 131). In their
analysis of the Dunedin longitudinal study, Caspi et al.
examined the structure of psychopathology from adoles-
cence to mid-life, considering dimensionality, persist-
ence, co-occurrence and sequential comorbidity. They
found that vulnerability to mental disorder was more
convincingly described by one general psychopathology
factor – labelled the ‘p’ (for pathology) factor – than by
three high-order (spectral) factors (internalizing, exter-
nalizing and thought disorder). A higher p factor score
was associated with ‘more life impairment, greater
familiality, worse developmental histories, and more
compromised early-life brain function’ ([3], p. 131). In
the meantime, several studies have replicated this
higher-order p factor [8–11]. Importantly, the p factor
concept may thus also explain why discovering isolated
causes, consequences or biomarkers and specific, tai-
lored treatments for psychiatric disorders has proved so
elusive for the field [3].
This work on a general factor of psychopathology has
recently also been extended to childhood and adolescence.
A longitudinal study of 2450 girls aged 5–11 years, for
instance, has further indicated the criterion validity of the
p factor construct, and found it a significantly better fit
than a correlated two-factor (internalizing and externaliz-
ing) model [9]. These findings weaken the argument that
the p factor is a statistical artefact and reinforce the im-
portance of further consideration of what the p factor
might substantively represent [9]. In a large (n = 23,477)
community-based sample aged 11–13.5 years, Patalay et
al. investigated the traditional two-factor (internalizing
and externalizing) model and a bi-factor model with a
general psychopathology higher-order model [12].
Both models were found to fit the data well; however,
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the general psychopathology however better predicted fu-
ture psychopathology and academic attainment 3 years
from the time of original assessment; with individuals with
high p scores being 10 times as likely to have diagnosable
disorder 3 years from assessment than individuals with
lower p scores (see also [8]).
More specifically in relation to PDs, Sharp and col-
leagues have considered the question of whether a gen-
eral factor for psychopathology exists in the context of
PD diagnosis [13]. In a series of exploratory factor ana-
lyses based on a sample of 966 inpatients, only four of
the six PDs (avoidant, schizotypal, narcissistic, and anti-
social) examined formed factors with 75% of the criteria
that mark their respective factors. Half the obsessive-
compulsive PD criteria loaded with the narcissistic PD
criteria, and the other half split across two other factors.
However, Sharp et al. found that (a) a BPD factor in-
cluded primary loadings from just over half (55.6%) of
the BPD items, of which three had notable cross-
loadings, each on a different factor; (b) nearly half
(44.4%) of BPD items loaded most strongly on three
non-BPD factors (although two had notable cross-
loadings on the BPD factor); and (c) the BPD factor was
also marked by a narcissistic PD item and had notable
additional cross-loadings by other narcissistic as well as
avoidant and schizotypal PD items. In the same study,
Sharp et al. evaluated a bi-factor model of PD pathology
in which a general factor and several specific factors of
personality pathology account for the covariance among
PD criteria. In the bi-factor model, it was found that all
BPD criteria loaded only on to the general factor. Other
PDs loaded either on to both the general and a specific
factor or largely only on to a specific factor. The impli-
cation of this is that BPD criteria may capture the core
of personality pathology, or may be most representative
of all PDs. To compound more widely the salient status
of BP traits, Caspi et al., in their work on the p factor,
found that in terms of personality information, individ-
uals who scored highly on the general psychopathology
scale were characterized by ‘three traits that compromise
processes by which people maintain stability – low
Agreeableness, low Conscientiousness and high Neuroti-
cism; that is, high-p individuals experience difficulties in
regulation/control when dealing with others, the envir-
onment and the self ’ ([3], p. 131). Such a profile appears
to capture the core features of BPD – emotion dysregu-
lation, impulsivity and social dysfunction – and speaks
to trait profile approaches to PD [14]. Yet, to claim that
such a profile in itself in some sense explains the devel-
opmental and life-course forecast that comes from ‘p’
obviously risks approaching circularity.
The question that then remains is: what is the mean-
ing of the general psychopathology factor at the level of
mental mechanisms? Currently, we can only speculate
about the nature of this generic aetiological factor, but
one association to be investigated may be childhood
maltreatment. Studies indeed suggest that maltreatment,
like p, increases the chance of most types of mental ill-
ness in adulthood [15] and worsens the course of mental
illness [16]. It has been recently suggested that child-
hood maltreatment may be an ecophenotype associated
with an earlier age at onset of psychopathology, greater
symptom severity, higher levels of comorbidity, greater
risk for suicide and, importantly, a poorer response to
treatment [17].
In our opinion, research findings on maltreatment, al-
though still too narrow, indeed point the way to under-
standing some of the mechanisms underlying the
association between the p-factor and vulnerability to
(severe) psychopathology This emphasis on the role of
adversity should not be associated with a narrowly envir-
onmental position on the relationship between adversity
and BPD. Such a position would stand counter to grow-
ing evidence for a genetic determinant of BPD. Research
showing the familial nature of BPD [18, 19], and classical
twin studies that place heritability of BPD at around
40–50% [20–23], have been borne out further by more
complex behaviour–genetic models that take into account
siblings, spouses and twins [24]. Although a genetic
anomaly associated with BPD has not so far been
identified, it appears that an endophenotype for the
disorder may be recognized. For example, impulsive
aggression and suicidal behaviour have been linked to
the tryptophan hydroxylase (TPH) gene, and patients
with BPD have a higher frequency of two out of eight
polymorphisms in one of the two known isoforms of
the TPH gene [25].
Impulsive aggression has also been connected with re-
duced serotonergic responsiveness and the inefficient
(short or ‘s’) allele of 5-HTTLPR. This has been identi-
fied in patients with BPD [26] in some but not all ac-
counts (e.g. [27]). There are suggestions that the s allele
marks a vulnerability to stressful life events [28] on the
one hand, and the positive influence of maternal sensi-
tivity [29] on the other. Accumulating evidence supports
the view that the s allele, in combination with secure at-
tachment, increases agreeable yet autonomous social be-
haviour in adolescents [30]. In the context of attachment
insecurity, this polymorphism is linked with poor self-
regulation [31] and impulsiveness [30]. The implication
may be that the s allele increases social sensitivity, mak-
ing a child both more and less prosocial in response to
different environmental stimuli.
Furthermore, the methylation of certain genes could
mediate the long-term effects of adversity [32]. The gluco-
corticoid receptor gene promoter, for instance, has been
shown to be more methylated in samples of brain tissue
of individuals who had experienced adversity and suicide
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[33]. The methylation of NR3C1 is associated with severity
of maltreatment from DNA samples collected from per-
ipheral blood leucocytes in bipolar disorder [34] and also
in BPD [35]. In general, inherited differences in specific
genes thus may moderate the effects of adversity and de-
termine who is more resilient [36].
Interactional models of biological vulnerability com-
bined with psychosocial risks are therefore being in-
creasingly considered in relation to BPD (e.g. [37, 38]).
The emphasis placed on social adversity in this paper
should not be regarded as a statement of the exclusive
pre-eminence of the environment in understanding the
developmental origins of PD. Rather, the assumption
that should be understood to underpin our discussion of
the role of maltreatment and adversity is that such expe-
riences in individuals who are biologically susceptible
(and there may be different genetic routes that lead to
this susceptibility) cumulatively strain the viability of re-
silience and, as we shall demonstrate, epistemic trust.
BPD as a limitation of psychological resilience
In further clarifying the relationship between BPD and
the p factor, Kalisch and colleagues’ [6] conceptual
framework for the neurobiology of resilience is enlight-
ening. Kalisch et al. [6] argue that psychological resili-
ence is not an absence of disease processes, but a
reflection of the work of active, biologically based mech-
anisms. In considering the relationship between PD and
adversity, we have similarly tended to focus on identify-
ing the characteristics of the patient who is experiencing
mental health difficulties rather than attempting to de-
lineate the competencies or capacities of the person who
has remained functional and free of disorder despite
substantial hardship. In fact, studies suggest that only a
minority of individuals develop persisting trauma-related
pathology as a result of experiencing or witnessing a sin-
gle extreme or life-threatening event (e.g. Type I
trauma). The majority of people have a remarkable cap-
acity for resilience when faced with such events [39, 40].
Rather than searching for the clinical indicators of a
transdiagnostic concept such as p, we may be wiser con-
ceptualizing p as an indication of the absence of resilience
and focusing on identifying mechanisms that ‘normally’
protect individuals from harsh conditions. Perhaps p may
be more appropriately considered as pointing to protec-
tion (or rather the absence of protection).
Resilience has always been an important theme in dis-
course on mental health [41, 42] but recent concerns
about healthcare costs have led to the concept increas-
ingly occupying centre stage [43]. Work on the topic
covers myriad different factors and explanations associ-
ated with psychological resilience, such as living in a stable
and comfortable neighbourhood, family resources and
family support, participating in community sporting or
extracurricular activities, racial or gender socialization, be-
ing securely attached, being able to regulate one’s emo-
tions, exposure to a sensitive style of parenting, or genetic
factors. Many of these factors overlap conceptually as well
as statistically. They are not explanations for resilience,
but rather factors that predict the activation of psycho-
logical or biological mechanisms that produce resilience
(the absence of pathology in the presence of adversity) as
an outcome. Sadly, this conceptual clarity is often lacking
in writings about resilience, especially those that concern
interventions aimed at its promotion.
The diverse accounts of resilience, often advanced at
radically different levels of explanation – from socioeco-
nomic through to genetic – can be unified within the
positive appraisal style theory of resilience (PASTOR) con-
ceptual framework presented by Kalisch et al. [6]. Accord-
ing to this formulation, the process underlying resilience is
driven by top-down processes in the form of the appraisal
that is made of a stressful stimulus. The external and so-
cial factors that have been associated with resilience (such
as social support or a secure attachment history) affect
resilience either directly or indirectly in that they shape
the individual’s appraisal approach, or minimize exposure
to stressors. This is not to deny the role of socio-
environmental factors in determining an individual’s
resilience, or to deny the importance of interventions
at a social or community level; it is to suggest that
the mechanism by which these distal social factors
affect individual resilience is via their impact on the
individual’s appraisal style.
Resilience and reappraisal
The appraisal theory of resilience is based on a specific
understanding of the nature of higher-order cognition
[44]. The theory is that the resilience process is as follows:
a potentially stressful stimulus is perceived and mentally
represented by the individual. The mental representation
is then appraised using higher-order cognition, understood
in terms of an ensemble of psychological mechanisms and
phenomena, including executive function, attention, gen-
eral intelligence and self-awareness. This in turn deter-
mines the emotional response of the individual – their
resilience.
We consider this an important perspective but a narrow
interpretation of what may be considered higher-order cog-
nition. The outputs of neural processing intrinsically de-
pend on the processing units that take input from the
output of other units, perform specific functions, and gen-
erate output that in turn becomes the input of other pro-
cesses. In most models of brain function, any psychological
capacity is underpinned by a large number of such hypo-
thetical processes [45, 46]. In this context, the nature of the
organization of processing units, or indeed the system that
determines their relative activation, may be either a simple
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function of the efficiency of processing or, within a hier-
archical system, determined by the functioning of a higher-
order system. The higher-order meta-system monitors the
performance of lower-order systems to ensure optimal per-
formance within a particular context. These components of
higher-order cognition are what constitute the core of a
normal wakeful and wilful mind in the process of conscious
perception, imagination, decision-making and action plan-
ning. These functions, taken together, create an opportun-
ity for the internal reorganization of neural structures
within the human brain. A consistently ‘self-observing’
process, which monitors the quality of outcome of neural
processing units, enables the individual to reorganize the
way neural structures subserve cognitive function. Menta-
lizing is a key facet of this self-observational process, and
the extent to which intentionality fulfils expected behav-
ioural outcomes is a critical indicator of the efficiency of
neural processing and guides the way information pro-
cessing is organized within available pertinent neural
units. We assume that an efficiently functioning human
brain representing a resilient system achieves such robust-
ness because mentalizing provides a clear window on the
efficiency of brain functioning. Multiple processing units
cover similar functions in the brain. Some units, being
more efficient than others, are more likely to be providers
of output that is taken forward to other units. But circum-
stances change, and demands for adaption may reverse
the hierarchy of efficient functioning of these processing
units. Resilience is the appropriate appraisal and monitor-
ing of the external social environment and internal func-
tioning of processing units. Thus, as we will explain in
more detail in Part 2 of this paper, higher-order cognition
is the developmental capacity, based on early relationships
and constantly renewed in changing social contexts, to ap-
praise the efficiency of functioning, which in essence is
intersubjective in its nature. The capacity to anticipate the
reaction of another person, to regulate attention or to im-
plement action plans are all shaped by the overarching
need for survival in the context of social interaction. A
failure of resilience arises when the individual is unable to
change processing systems in a sufficiently flexible manner
to maintain optimum outcome despite changed circum-
stances. When an individual cannot disengage a process-
ing system that is no longer appropriate to the task – for
example, a child whose perfectionistic attitudes serve
them well during a period of knowledge acquisition and
relatively simple tasks, but cause great problems when
task complexity has increased to a point where perfection
is impossible – the lack of flexibility is what creates vul-
nerability. Insensitivity does not create risk; the sensitivity
of higher-order cognition is what provides protection
through the appropriate appraisal of the functioning of
neural structures relative to the environment. This is how
the resilient brain functions; it is not a model that skirts
reification – it is a description of our assumptions of the
nature of brain function.
Higher-order cognition appears to be more flexible
within the brain than other, more specialized modal
forms of cognition such as basic vision and hearing. For
example, brains are able to preserve core aspects of the
functional architecture of the information processing
that sustains higher-order cognition in spite of substan-
tial structural damage [47]. Higher-order cognition is a
form of information processing, therefore, that does not
completely rely on one single, static or fixed set of spe-
cialized brain regions and anatomical connections,
within certain limits of course. It works by exploiting
available neural resources and possible routes between
them; it seems to use degenerated and pluripotent brain
systems flexibly, enabling higher-order cognition to
emerge as one of the most robust brain functions. In
that sense, the mind does not exist in one physical loca-
tion within the brain; rather, it is an abstraction, or code,
and the brain is the code interpreter. Basic conscious-
ness – the mechanism for the resiliency of cognitive and
control systems – is thought to have evolved to be max-
imally resilient itself: ‘consciousness itself can be inter-
preted as a general algorithm for resilience selected by
evolution’ ([47], p.22). This decoupling of higher-order
cognition from a single location appears to be highly
adaptive: its relatively abstract and algorithmic nature
makes it more robust in the face of any localized damage
or degeneration within the brain.
The algorithmic quality of consciousness may be
regarded as a pinnacle of human evolution, but this
should not detract from its highly pragmatic, adaptive
purposes. This resilient framework is an essential condi-
tion for functioning autonomy and the capacity to adapt
to the world’s demands – particularly the highly complex
demands of the human social world. As Paradiso and
Rudrauf [48] have argued in their article on social cogni-
tion and social neuroscience, tellingly entitled ‘Struggle
for life, struggle for love and recognition: the neglected
self in social cognitive neuroscience’, the self, self-
awareness and intersubjectivity are integral to social cog-
nitions and actions. As described above, the appropriate
functioning of higher-order cognition crucially depends
on appropriate judgements about social contexts. In this
sense, social cognition is part of the mechanism of
higher-order cognition, although social cognition itself is
made up of a set processes that are monitored by the
metacognitive evaluations that higher-order cognition
performs: as in any feedback system, there is an inherent
circularity in this conceptualization. This is inevitable
given that we are describing the extent to which a sys-
tem is capable of reorganizing its own functioning. Simi-
larly, the modes of operationalizing the self and the
identification of self-awareness are strongly shaped by
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developmental contributions from the social environ-
ment – parents, sibling, peers and significant others. In
other words, the abstract algorithm that creates personal
consciousness cannot be separated from social interac-
tions. This is what the algorithm was developed for, and
what further shapes the algorithm of the self and its on-
going relationship with the outside world.
Although there are many factors at work in contribut-
ing to resilience, Kalisch describes the three underpin-
ning appraisal mechanisms that determine resilient
behaviour and responses [6], as follows:
1 Positive situation classification. This refers to the
manner of immediate appraisal of a situation at the
moment of encountering it (e.g. ‘What is the person
approaching me carrying in their hand?’). In the case
of an insignificant threat, a positive appraisal style
enables the individual to view it in a manageable
perspective. Clearly, in the context of an adverse
event, a negative appraisal and stress response are
called for. In such situations, resilience can be
subsequently promoted through the second and
third forms of appraisal.
2 The retrospective reappraisal of threat. Whether a
traumatic event results in post-traumatic stress
disorder, for example, is dependent on how it is
retrospectively reappraised [49, 50]. This, as Kalisch
et al. describe it, ‘shifts the emphasis from the
external situation (or changes in the situation) to
the individual’s ability to flexibly adjust current
negative appraisal or to implement new, more
positive appraisals and then to maintain those
appraisals. Both processes have to occur in the face
of interference from automatic and uncontrolled
negative appraisals and the accompanying aversive
emotional states’ ([6], p. 14).
3 Inhibition of retraumatizing triggers. This mechanism
enables the individual to inhibit the threat-associated
sensations that might be
experienced when remembering a traumatic
event and serve to reinforce, perpetuate and
generalize the sense of threat.
BPD and the PASTOR model of resilience
To return to BPD, we can follow the PASTOR model by
distinguishing between resilience factors and mecha-
nisms. We suggest that a traditional clinical mistake in
the treatment of BPD has been to intervene at the level
of resilience factors rather than at the level of appraisal
(i.e. mechanisms) – this in effect means that we have
been working at the level of correlation rather than
causation. In BPD, the appraisal mechanisms are at fault,
in large part because of mentalizing difficulties (e.g. in
the mistaken appraisal of threat at the moment of its
presentation) or a breakdown in epistemic trust,
which damages the capacity to relearn different ways
of mentalizing – or appraising – situations (i.e. the inability
to change our understanding of the threat after the event).
The outcome is the lack of resilience that is highly charac-
teristic of BPD, regardless of its clinical presentation.
BPD and positive situation appraisal
Mentalizing has an interpretive role and allows us to ex-
plain and predict behaviour; in this sense it also has a
social regulatory role [51]. Behaviour can be produced
by rational interactions among beliefs and desires,
which, when interpreted (appraised) according to spe-
cific culturally determined expectations, generate mean-
ing (a meaning assigned to the observed action) in terms
of putative mental states that could have engendered the
perceived behaviours. Therefore, for our behaviour to be
socially meaningful (predictable), it can and should obey
these same conventions. Frequent behavioural deviations
from these expectations may be considered as being core
to PD. This is confusing and stressful for the observer
because the normal process of reconstructing mental
states from actions is disrupted.
The great importance of this process of meaning
generation has been powerfully illustrated by studies
in which participants were led to believe that deter-
ministic neurological processes, rather than mental
states, control behaviour: in other words, they were
discouraged from believing in free will. Introducing
an abstract disbelief in free will led to an observed
weakening of neural signals associated with readiness
planning; subjects became less prepared to act volun-
tarily [52]. Setting up a deterministic neurological bias
also appeared to ‘free’ individuals from a sense of per-
sonal responsibility and generated more antisocial
cheating and aggression [53].
If mentalizing is assumed to have such an interpret-
ative and regulatory role, then individuals with BPD who
have limited capacity to exercise this regulative function
are at least partially deprived of the appraisal processes
needed to reduce the stress of any social experience.
This leaves them at times confused and vulnerable in
both the interpretation and the convention-governed ex-
pression of mental states in behaviour. To put it plainly,
they are frequently puzzled by others’ actions, and
equally find themselves victims of misattributions by
others. There is ample clinical evidence of limitations of
appraisal in BPD (for examples, see [54–57]) although
undoubtedly, as would be predicted by the p factor
model, they are by no means the only clinical group to
show concerning limitations in this area. Poor appraisal
may be more severe and pervasive in BPD than, for
instance, in major depressive disorder or generalized
anxiety disorder without PD comorbidity.
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Individuals with BPD tend to be very prone to
automatic, non-reflective mentalizing; they often base
their inferences on the immediate exterior features of
others, and rely on affective rather than cognitive
mentalizing. This has clear implications for the style
in which they are likely to appraise social situations.
As a result of their mentalizing tendencies, individuals
with BPD tend to appraise situations and read others’
expressions quite quickly: they may show a hypersen-
sitivity to facial expressions [58, 59] and higher-than-
normal sensitivity to non-verbal communication [60,
61]. For example, individuals with BPD have been found to
outperform non-BPD comparisons on the Reading the
Mind in the Eyes Test [62] or to be at least as good as nor-
mal controls on the same test [56, 63]. However, this em-
phasis on external and immediate cues in appraisal
situations is accompanied by difficulties in making more re-
flective judgements based on what might be going on inside
people’s minds – so, for example, individuals with BPD
tend to perform more poorly in social exchange tasks [55,
64]. They have also been found to be more likely to view
characters/behaviours as negative or aggressive [65]; to have
an impaired view of neutral faces in the context of anger or
disgust [66]; and to react with hostility to neutral social in-
teractions [67] – all suggestive of the negative appraisal
style described by Kalisch and colleagues [6]. The emphasis
on affective mentalizing also results in a heightened sensi-
tivity to emotional cues [59], especially in cases of anger
and fear [68, 69]. Furthermore, unbalanced mentalizing on
the self–other dimension can cause individuals with BPD
to experience severe difficulties in separating the self from
the other [70–73] and to be unduly emotionally affected by
others’ affective states. This often leads to the experience of
emotional contagion, which has clear implications for social
appraisal situations [74, 75]: BPD individuals can feel forced
to be rigid and highly controlling in order to maintain a
subjective sense of coherence and integrity [76].
The mentalizing profile characteristic of an individual
with BPD, in sum, results in an oversensitivity to possibly
difficult social interactions (because distortions in menta-
lizing are more likely to result in mistaken interpretations
of others’ behaviour and motivation). In the aftermath of a
challenging or stressful interaction, it is difficult for the in-
dividual to make sense of, contextualize or put aside po-
tentially upsetting memories of experiences, leaving them
more vulnerable to emotional storms. A capacity for expli-
cit, reflective mentalizing in particular serves a dual inter-
pretive (appraisal-strengthening) and self-regulatory role.
The absence of this capacity deprives the individual of a
fundamental tool in reducing stress.
However, one can see that in certain situations, for ex-
ample, an emergency milieu characterized by high levels
of interpersonal aggression, the heightened and immediate
sensitivity and seemingly instinctive and physically
charged form of appraisal characteristic of BPD might in
fact be adaptive, at least in the short term. In such an en-
vironment, extreme vigilance is a potential advantage, and
similarly, the ability to form intense emotional relation-
ships quickly might elicit resources or protection. The
mentalizing profile associated with BPD and the appraisal
style this generates is maladaptive in most stable social
contexts, but we postulate that this mentalizing profile
may be a response to cues suggestive of an unreliable and
potentially threatening social environment. We thus
should be wary of seeing apparent dysfunctions of the
clinically ‘hard to reach’ as indicative of a deficit or any
kind of sub-optimal functioning (as, indeed, we have done
previously [77]). We would now consider that what may
appear to us as dysfunction is an evolutionarily primed
adaptation to specific environmental and social contexts.
As a genetically triggered adaptation, the individual is bio-
logically programmed to resist change in a behaviour pat-
tern that signals increased chances of selection. We
believe that enduring mental disorders (including BPD)
are nested in the context of the evolutionary priorities of
the human condition.
BPD and retrospective reappraisal
The mentalizing difficulties of BPD patients have also
considerable implications for understanding the difficul-
ties with retrospective reappraisal that may undermine
resilience. Reappraisal can attenuate ongoing stress re-
sponses by appropriately adjusting negative appraisals
and/or generating complementary positive appraisals. In
strongly aversive situations the stress response is essen-
tially unavoidable: the experience is automatically classi-
fied as negative and requires ‘after the event’ changes in
the meaning of the stimuli. This is often achieved
through reappraisal in terms of the mental states of the
protagonists. To retrospectively appraise an event or
situation in a way that promotes resilience, an individual
needs to be able to reappraise it in a way that involves
reflective, cognitive mentalizing. Such reappraisal will
often also depend upon a capacity to mentalize the in-
ternal states of both the other and the self. In other
words, the mentalizing strengths that this form of retro-
spective reappraisal requires are not congruent with the
mentalizing profile typical of BPD, which is character-
ized by (a) a tendency to focus on the external rather
than internal states of others; (b) the dominance of auto-
matic, intuitive mentalizing over controlled, reflective,
mentalizing that could help to put the potentially trau-
matic event into perspective;(c) an imbalance between
affect and cognition in favour of the former, leading to
self-perpetuating persistence of negative affect; and, fi-
nally, (d) difficulties in coherently representing the self
independently of the other, undermining the potential to
contextualize and make proportionate an event.
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The mentalizing model for trauma has reappraisal of
physical and psychological experience at its core [78, 79].
Similarly, trauma-focused cognitive-behavioural therapy
and other exposure-based therapies (e.g. eye movement
desensitization and reprocessing therapy) enhance menta-
lizing of the trauma experience, creating a second-order
representation of the event in terms of greater coherence
of the subjective experience of the victim and often also
the perpetrator. Patients with BPD have a specific problem
in relation to reappraisal proper because they find it chal-
lenging to generate second-order representations of men-
tal states that might be modified to constitute more
positive reappraisals of experiences or modify and thus
mitigate (adjust) negative appraisals. In essence, this lies at
the core of Gunderson and Lyons-Ruth’s interpersonal
hypersensitivity theory of BPD [80]. Interpersonal hyper-
sensitivity is the likely consequence of a failure of re-
appraisal following stressful social interactions. In the
absence of being able to mentalize in a balanced way, an
event or a relationship can be endlessly discussed and dis-
sected in an apparent attempt at reappraisal, but such at-
tempts have an unreal quality. Complicated inferences
about mental states are made, but they might have little
connection with reality. We term this pseudomentalizing,
or in extreme, hypermentalizing; it is a state of mind that
can be clinically misleading in that it may present as a
strong attempt at reflection and engagement, but it will
ultimately be circular and unproductive. Hypermentalizing
of trauma, the failure to move on from it, may be inevit-
able if individuals cannot reliably access and use social
communication that could enable them to resolve or con-
tain the sense of threat associated with a trauma (or if a
perceived threat that has been misinterpreted as such,
owing to problems in the first resilience mechanism).
However, as our understanding of this state of ‘petrifica-
tion’ has deepened [81], we also have come to recognize
that mentalizing is not everything, or rather, that bodily
experience has an important role in enabling access to fur-
ther resilience strategies. This brings us to the importance
of inhibition mechanisms.
BPD and the interference inhibition mechanism
According to Kalisch et al.’s conceptual framework [6],
the final level of appraisal underpinning resilience is an
inhibition mechanism based on interference. As men-
tioned above, a strongly aversive event naturally gener-
ates powerful negative appraisal responses. The ability to
moderate and regulate such negative responses after the
event can further determine the extent to which the
event continues to cause difficulties in psychological
functioning. This implies the inhibition of conflictive
negative appraisals and acting deliberately to interfere
with emotional reactions to information processing. The
inhibition of negative and disruptive responses through
distraction or interference can enable the individual to
begin the process of reappraisal proper, allowing a more
resilient response to emerge. An individual’s inhibitory
capacity may to a large part be a trait-like characteristic,
with some genetic basis. However, the extent to which
the inhibition mechanism can be overwhelmed and how
its restoration can be managed may be malleable to
some degree.
Although much has been written on the nature of
traumatic experiences, within the view outlined in this
paper, an aversive event becomes traumatic in its after-
math when it is accompanied by a sense that one is not
accompanied – that one’s mental experience is not
shared and the ‘mind is alone’ [78, 82]. Trauma obtains
from a primitive, adaptive human terror of isolation.
Here, again, we run into the key importance of social
referencing to calibrate the mind. In the process of re-
appraisal, the social referencing provided by being able
to access another mind enables us to frame and put into
perspective an otherwise overwhelmingly frightening ex-
perience. This process, which drives a so-called
broaden-and-build cycle [83], is far more available to in-
dividuals who are open to the benign social influence of
other minds. As outlined in more detail in Part 2 of this
paper, those who are able to manifest sufficient levels of
epistemic trust to embark on the mutually mentalizing
stance that is essential in soliciting other minds in sup-
port of one’s own, are therefore more likely to be resili-
ent. The commonly observed vicious cycle of BPD,
comorbid trauma and the acute subjective experience of
isolation captures the implications of the failure of this
inhibition reappraisal mechanism.
Individuals with the diagnosis of BPD have been
shown to have serious limitations in their capacity for
the inhibition of conflictive negative appraisals and for
interfering emotional reactions to information process-
ing. They cannot cognitively inhibit retraumatizing trig-
gers, leaving them vulnerable to threat-associated
sensations that might be experienced when remembering
a traumatic event, which serve to reinforce the sense of
threat. It is not possible for these individuals to access
mentalizing if the self is overwhelmed by negative inter-
ference that impairs normal cognitive function. This is
congruent with the view that emotional dysregulation is
the fundamental problem in BPD [84–86]. The idea of a
failure of inhibition in BPD also echoes recently reported
findings from Koenigsberg et al. concerning the failure
of habituation in BPD [87, 88], which may have a genetic
basis [89].
We have similarly (albeit not formulated in terms of
the failure of interference or habituation) described the
phenomenology of the unyielding nature of trauma-
linked subjective experience in BPD [90] in terms of
alien self experiences that consist of a sense of looming,
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unmanageable anxieties that cannot be reappraised and
contained, as the subjective outcome of incorporating an
experience of overwhelming hostility into the self [91].
In this context, the focus is not on the development of
this experience but rather how it is so persistently main-
tained despite intense and persistent efforts at re-
appraisal. This shift in perspective involves a recognition
of the significance of the capacity for inhibition in the
treatment of BPD. Individuals who are very poor at
mentalizing may require more than cognitive interven-
tions (talking) to bring about the inhibition of the stress
response. Interventions may have to relate to the body
more directly. We have always had a view that mentaliz-
ing was embodied [92], but we have not treated this fact
seriously enough. We now see a role for physical activity
in strengthening the capacity for inhibition at the same
time as helping to restore mentalizing. In clinical terms,
we suggest that physical activity has a role in strengthen-
ing the capacity for inhibition at the same time as, or as
a precursor to, helping to restore mentalizing. Perhaps
new areas for developing effective interventions may lie
in this direction. For example, if an adolescent cannot
communicate, activating interference to permit re-
appraisal via physical activity may well be more valuable
than spending hours attempting to activate mentalizing
via talking and reflection. The best initial approach may
be a physical one: running with them, and discussing
what the running was like. Such a simple focus on the
embodied experience can be used to begin to rehearse
the most basic principle of responding to and giving
space to a stimulus outside the negative responses that
normally overwhelm other forms of social cognition.
Conclusions
Although we still consider attachment and mentalizing
to be key in our understanding of personality pathology,
and in earlier formulations we have always emphasized
the importance of the absence of resilience in BPD, there
has been a notable shift in our views on the emergence
and nature of BPD. Rather than seeing BPD primarily in
terms of the presence of impairments in attachment and
mentalizing, we consider the notable absence of resili-
ence and the social communicative inflexibility that
seems to underlie this absence as an adaptive strategy
that individuals with BPD acquire within a social context
where social inflexibility was often the only possible sur-
vival strategy and had considerable advantages in the
short term.
We will further elaborate on these issues in Part 2 of
this paper. Currently we are still faced with an important
theoretical dilemma: from where does this absence of
positive reappraisal mechanisms stem? How can we
understand the inflexibility in social communicative pro-
cesses in BPD and in all those suffering from serious
psychopathology, which seems to render these individ-
uals so ‘hard to reach’? How did this inflexibility develop
over time? We believe that the answers to these ques-
tions lie in an evolutionarily informed developmental
psychopathology account of BPD and related disorders
that has considerable implications for prevention and
intervention.
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